The analysis of the declining impact of piracy on maritime routes and vessel behaviours in the Indian Ocean is here performed using Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) reports. A 5-year archive of vessel position data covering the period characterized by the highest number of attacks and the subsequent decline provides a unique source for data-driven statistical analysis that highlights changes in routing and sailing speeds. The work, besides demonstrating the value of LRIT data for statistical maritime traffic analysis, can be used to ultimately provide quantitative support to the estimates of the additional fuel consumption due to piracy. In showing the return of the North-South traffic to the shortest path, the results testify to the effectiveness of the efforts put in place against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean.
Introduction
Piracy at sea is an old problem that persists to modern times in a number of hot spots across the world. During the last decade, piracy emanating from Somalia has seen a surge, to become the most serious threat to global shipping, and a subsequent decline. The root causes of the piracy have been ascribed to the lack of government in Somalia as well as the lack of economic opportunities. Its impact was exacerbated because one of the world's most important maritime trade routes lies along the Somali coast, namely the connection between Asia and the Persian Gulf with Europe, through the Gulf of Aden. Another important route is the North-South one along the East African coast. The Somali piracy therefore has had a big economic impact, quantified e.g. in [1, 2] , and the practice of hostage taking has also led to considerable human suffering [3] .
Already in 2008, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a first resolution 1 that, together with the already existing UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [4] , empowered foreign navies to act against piracy in the waters around Somalia. Even after that, the area of pirate operations out of Somalia continued to expand in the coastal waters to most of the North-Eastern Indian Ocean. A series of other UN resolutions on Somali and wider piracy followed, the last one from 2012 2 . International merchant shipping tended to avoid coming close to Somalia. As the neighbouring countries of Somalia in the region did not have the capacity or (earlier on) the priority to protect international shipping, foreign states have mounted operations to that end, often in international alliances. Foreign naval assets have been deployed to escort ships going to Somalia and passing through the Gulf of Aden, to monitor fishing, and to police the wide maritime area at risk to stop and apprehend pirates. The international naval alliances active around Somalia are: Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 3 under the 30-nations Combined Maritime Forces partnership [5] ; NATO Operation Ocean Shield 4 ; and EU Naval Force Atalanta 5 . In addition, countries have operated on an individual basis, such as China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia and Iran.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol Such foreign naval deployments are undesirable in the long termfor one thing, they are expensive to maintain. Therefore, a series of programs and projects have been set up to create the capacity to deliver maritime security by the countries in the region. Important donors include the EU (both as a block and by individual member States), U.S. and Japan. Often, projects are implemented through UN Agencies, in particular the International Maritime Organization (IMO) [6] and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) [7] . Among other things, IMO induced the establishment of the Djibouti Code of Conduct 6 under which 20 countries in the region have signed up to cooperate to repress piracy. The EU programs mostly target civilian authorities working in regional cooperations, but other programs support militaries and individual countries in their maritime capacity building. In addition to that, there are even larger aid programs to help rebuild Somalia itself, as the long term solution against piracy and for humanitarian reasons.
Apart from what governments have done, the shipping industry has taken great pains to protect itself. Best Management Practices (BMP) [8] have been designed by industry bodies, giving guidelines on how to prepare for and behave during a transit through the High Risk Area (HRA) in order to minimise risks. The HRA is the geographic delimitation of the Somali piracy risk area, agreed upon by shipping industry, insurance companies and stakeholder governments 7 . Recommended preparations include the installation of barbed wire and a citadel, recommended behaviour e.g. to keep a watch, maintain a long distance from the Somalia coast and sail at higher speeds. The latter two behaviours have contributed much to the cost inflicted by piracy on the industry (sailing a higher speeds is very fuel-inefficient). Moreover, ships have taken to carrying armed guards on board, sometimes military personnel, sometimes civilian/commercial, after flag state and regional governments have adapted regulations to accommodate that. The international merchant shipping passing through the HRA communicates with the international naval forces via so-called shipping centres, where ships call in to report their positions and status, and get advised on the security situation. Three main shipping centres are active in the region: the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) [9] , the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) [10] , and the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) [11] . MSCHOA was set up especially for the piracy off Somalia and forms part of Operation Atalanta, whereas the other two have a wider mandate.
At global level, all initiatives related to Somali piracy are coordinated by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) [12] . This is an informal collaboration spawned by the UN with a rotating chair, currently held by the EU 8 . A dedicated working group under CGPCS makes recommendations about Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).
Today, early 2015, the piracy risk off Somalia is much suppressed, thanks to all measures discussed above. No ships have been hijacked since 2013. However, as Somalia is still not a stable and prosperous state, many of the root causes are still present, and the networks for the piracy operations that have been built up in Somalia have probably not been dismantled. It is therefore believed that a minimum amount of foreign-led counter-piracy activities will need to be continued, in connection with the continuation of the capacity building work, which is meanwhile expanding its remit from pure counter-piracy to maritime security in general.
The rise and decline of piracy activities around Somalia in the last 6 years is reported in Table 1 .
Various organisations collect and compile piracy incidence data: apart from UKMTO, MSCHAO and NSC, these also include IMO and IMB 9 . They all use somewhat different criteria to include an event in their statistics and somewhat different definitions in their categorisations of event type ("suspicious event", "attack", etc.), making cross-comparisons less than straightforward. According to [13] , total attacksor attacks in the remainderare defined as "the combined number of all attacks mounted by suspect pirates; those repelled/aborted and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews taken hostage" whereas a disruption is "an action that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operation". Suspicious events are piracy related actions that are reported and shared with the merchant shipping community, but do not constitute attack.
A breakdown of attacks into six-month periods is shown in Fig. 1 . In this paper we analyse how the decline of piracy attacks is having an impact on vessel traffic along the North-South transport routes crossing the Indian Ocean, progressively restoring the navigation to conditions that minimise fuel consumption and time at sea.
Data and methods
Monitoring vessels at sea is an essential component of Maritime Situational Awareness, that is the understanding what is happening at sea and the possibility to project the current situational picture into the future. Knowing which vessels are located in a specific area, their state vector properties (e.g. position, velocity and direction), their type and the nature of activities they are carrying out (e.g. fishing, at anchor, sailing etc.) are essential to many governance responsibilities in the open sea, in particular to Search and Rescue (SAR) and security operations. In the context of piracy, the knowledge of what is happening at sea combined with met-oceanographic data and intelligence on potential Piracy Action Groups (PAGs) can be used to perform dynamic risk analysis [14] . In order to build the so called Maritime Situational Picture (MSP) in wide areas, data from many observation and self-reporting systems can be fused to track vessels at sea (see e.g. [15, 16] ). In the piracy context, the foreign naval forces operating in the area have used data from AIS and LRIT (see below) as well as call-in reports from the ships and their own observation systems to achieve the necessary MSA. AIS and LRIT are also being used in capacity building projects for maritime authorities in the region, e.g. under the EU-funded Piracy, Maritime Awareness and Risks (PMAR) project [17] .
Data set
Main ship-reporting data currently used to achieve near realtime tracking of vessels are automatic ship position reports from the Automatic Identification System (AIS) [18] and Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) [19] . AIS, originally designed for collision avoidance, is based on self-organising terrestrial cells whereby vessels broadcast their dynamic information (e.g. position, Speed Over Ground-SOG, Course Over Ground-COG, Rate of Turn etc.), static information (e.g. vessel type, size and identifiers) and voyage related information (e.g. Estimate Time of Arrival, destination and draft) over VHF. Such messages can be received by terrestrial receivers out to the radio horizon, which is normally several tens of nautical miles. Sometimes, under particular environmental conditions, AIS messages can be received much further away, even in the order of hundreds of nautical miles. The same messages can be received by Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite based receivers when they pass over, complementing ground based tracking information in open sea areas. AIS data collection is therefore limited in coverage, spatially for terrestrial receivers and temporally for satellite receivers. However, AIS can be detected by anyone in the neighbourhood of a vessel, increasing the vulnerability to security threats like piracy. For this reason, in special security areas, AIS can lawfully be switched off [8] leading to incomplete or even missing tracks. A more secure vessel tracking system is the LRIT as it is based on point-to-point satellite communication rather than public broadcasting. For this reason, LRIT offers the possibility to safely retrieve tracking information over areas affected by piracy. Furthermore, LRIT data are characterised by an almost uniform spatial coverage, and a uniform temporal sampling with a typically 6-hourly reporting interval. Although this is consistently lower than the few seconds to minutes of AIS (when in range), in wide areas this does not represent a serious limitation since the merchant vessels of interest in this study do not often change course over ground.
The dataset used in this study includes LRIT positions of ships flying the flag of states contributing to the EU LRIT Cooperative Data Centre (CDC), i.e. all EU Member States, Iceland, Norway, and Overseas Territories of EU Member States. During part of the 5-year period analysed here, in 2009 and 2010, the LRIT reporting frequency was increased over its nominal 6-hourly rate in the HRA as a special measure to better track the ships.
Route extraction and analysis
The algorithm developed is based on event detection and trajectories clustering and adapted from previously published work on AIS such as [20, 21] . First the LRIT messages are organised by IMO number, building "vessel" objects. Then, SOG and COGnot present in the LRIT message itselfare computed from consecutive positions. Subsequently, by defining two arbitrary polygons, all the direct vessel trips between such areas are isolated. In order to filter out itineraries presenting intermediate ports of call, the direct trajectories connecting such polygons must not contain additional "stops". Such "stop" events are detected by analysing the estimated velocities. The outcome of the algorithm is the group of trajectories that represent the routes connecting the pre-defined polygons. The pseudo-code is reported in Algorithms 1 and 2. 
Results
Algorithms 1 and 2 have been applied to the 5-year archive LRIT data in the Indian Ocean to map maritime trajectories covering the North-South and South-North routes along the East African coast (Fig. 2-left, red and green, respectively) .
The results have been aggregated over periods of six months (see Fig. 2-right) . The analysis is then applied to the subsequent periods of six months from July 2009 to July 2014 ( Fig. 3) , which saw the peak and the subsequent decline of attacks (see Fig. 1 ). The period of six months was selected for being matched to the pace of the behavioural changes of the merchant ships in the area. Inspection of the data on monthly basis shows no clear seasonal trends.
The time evolution of the routes is clearly correlated to the number of piracy attacks and disruptions recorded in the Indian Ocean: after 2010, progressively more vessels take advantage of a gradually reduced risk of being attacked and return to travelling along the shortest path.
In order to evaluate the extent of re-routing in the area we define the "inner", "middle" and "outer" routes respectively as the shortest path (through the red area in Fig. 4) , the passage North of Madagascar through the Mozambique Channel (light blue area) and the one East of Madagascar (green area). In Fig. 5 the proportion of inner, middle and outer routes shows the consistency of the trend re-establishing the shortest path as preferred route when the number of attacks starts reducing in the second half of 2011. It is worth noting that the inner and outer routes differ about 450 NM on average.
A similar trend can be observed with respect to the aggregated speed distribution along the route (see Fig. 6 ). Sailing at higher speed reduces the likelihood of being boarded by pirates if under attack. Such likelihood is minimised for speeds greater or equal to 18 knots. On the other hand, an increase of speed has a substantial impact on fuel consumption: as the risk of being attacked reduces, the speed is restored to more economical values in the area.
A quantitative analysis of vessel speed distributions in the fiveyear period is shown in Fig. 7 where the trend of the median vessel speed can be compared to the number of attacks reported in the Indian Ocean. A clear correlation between the restoring of lower speed values and the reduction of risk of being attacked can be clearly observed.
Discussion and conclusion
The recent decline of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean is due to a number of countermeasures put in place at international level and is progressively restoring the routes crossing the area to minimum distance patterns. In this paper, this process is demonstrated using LRIT positioning data archives from July 2009 to July 2014. Unlike other positioning systems such as AIS, which was commonly switched off in the area during times of high risk in order to reduce the vulnerability of being tracked by pirates, LRIT continued to provide uninterrupted position reports to the competent authorities. For this reason, LRIT is used in this study to reveal the evolution of vessel traffic and behaviours in the area. It is shown that in particular, vessel re-routing to avoid high risk areas has significantly decreased, with the result of saving on average 450 NM of navigation. Moreover, sailing at increased speed to minimise the risk of being successfully boarded by pirates had almost stopped at the end of the period. By making use of ship tracking data only, the paper shows the concurrence of re-routing and increased vessel speed, demonstrating how their progressive . Examples of LRIT tracks following the "inner" (passing through the red arealeft), "middle" (through the light blue areamiddle) and "outer" (through the green arearight) routes. (For interpretation of the references to color in the figure legends, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) Fig. 5 . Ratio between the three routes and total number of transits in the 5-year period. Since the second half of 2012 the shortest path (inner route) is preferred over the outer one. reduction is correlated with the declining number of piracy attacks. Both re-routing and sailing at higher speed are proxies for fuel consumption, so it can be concluded that maritime transport costs associated to these aspects and due to piracy in the Indian Ocean have considerably reduced from the first half of 2011 to mid-2014. The work gives the basis to further analyse and quantitatively estimate such financial implications, which could contribute to evaluate the efforts put in the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean.
Previously published work has concentrated in using tracking data for anomaly detection [22] , discovering knowledge out of tracking data such as routes [20, 21] or fishing activities [23] , investigating seasonal-scale variations [24] . The temporal variations analysed in this paper cover a period of five years, a timescale commensurate with the evolution of the piracy threat in the Indian Ocean.
The work demonstrates how spatial data miningapplied for the first time to LRIT data to discover half-yearly variations of trafficcan be used to understand the impact of geopolitical issues to maritime trade routes, a key element for policy and decision makers. 
